Bilimsel Araştırmanın Mantığı
Karl R. PopperOldest Bilimsel Araştırmanın Mantığı Quotes
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Moreover, if you admit as meaningful none except problems in natural science, the concept of ‘meaning’ will also turn out to be meaningless. The dogma of meaning, once enthroned, is elevated forever above the battle. It can no longer be attacked It has become (in Wittgenstein’s own words) ‘unassailable and definitive’.
Sayfa 30
natüralizm, gözlem ve nedensellik
Thus I reject the naturalistic view. It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe themselves to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into a dogma. This criticism of the naturalistic view applies not only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science, and consequently to its idea of empirical method.
Sayfa 31
METHODOLOGICAL RULES AS CONVENTIONS
Methodological rules are here regarded as conventions. They might be described as the rules of the game of empirical science. They differ from the rules of pure logic rather as do the rules of chess, which few would regard as part of pure logic: seeing that the rules of pure logic govern transformations of linguistic formulae, the result of an inquiry into the rules of chess could perhaps be entitled ‘The Logic of Chess’, but hardly ‘Logic’ pure and simple. (Similarly, the result of an inquiry into the rules of the game of science—that is, of scientific discovery— may be entitled ‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’.)
Two simple examples of methodological rules may be given. They will suffice to show that it would be hardly suitable to place an inquiry into method on the same level as a purely logical inquiry.
(1) The game of science is, in principle, without end. He who decides one day that scientific statements do not call for any further test, and that they can be regarded as finally verified, retires from the game.
(2) Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, and has proved its mettle,*1 it may not be allowed to drop out without ‘good reason’. A ‘good reason’ may be, for instance: replacement of the hypothesis by another which is better testable; or the falsification of one of the consequences of the hypothesis. (The concept ‘better testable’ will later be analysed more fully.)
These two examples show what methodological rules look like. Clearly they are very different from the rules usually called ‘logical’. Although logic may perhaps set up criteria for deciding whether a statement is testable, it certainly is not concerned with the question whether anyone exerts himself to test it.
Sayfa 32
Üst bir kural
In establishing these rules we may proceed systematically. First a supreme rule is laid down which serves as a kind of norm for deciding upon the remaining rules, and which is thus a rule of a higher type. It is the rule which says that the other rules of scientific procedure must be designed in such a way that they do not protect any statement in science against falsification.
Sayfa 33
degree of corroboration ≠ probability
Sayfa 33
It is usual to call an inference 'inductive' if it passes from
singular principle of induction (which he formulated as the 'principle of universal causation') to be 'a priori valid'. But I do not think that his ingenious attempt to provide an a priori justification for synthetic statements was successful.
Sayfa 5