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Anlam Yoğunluğu
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Benlik, deneyimlerin veya otopsikolojik durumların sınıfıdır toplanması değildir.
Benlik, temel deneyimin ifadesine ait değildir, yalnızca çok yüksek bir düzeyde inşa edilmiştir.
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"Dünyanın Mantıksal Yapısı"
If the basis of the constructional system is autopsychological, then the danger of subjectivism seems to arise. Thus, we are confronted with the problem of how we can achieve objectivity of knowledge 61 with such a system form. The requirement that knowledge be objective can be under- stood in two senses. It could mean objectivity in contrast to arbitrariness: if a judgment is said to reflect knowledge, then this means that it does not depend on my whims. Objectivity in this sense can obviously be required and achieved even if the basis for knowledge is autopsychological.
ErkenntnisKitabı okuyacak
The problem of the system form: how to formulate the constructional system so that all scientific objects find a place in it? (46). To solve this problem, the reducibility relations of the objects must be investigated. In the realistic, or matter of fact, language which is customary in the empirical sciences, "a is reducible to b, c" means the same as "for each state of affairs relative to a (b, c ) , a necessary and sufficient condition can be indicated which depends upon b and c alone" (47), or "there is an infallible and always present indicator which can be expressed through b and c". Since, in principle, science can produce such an indicator for every concept, it follows that all scientific objects are constructable (48, 49). The "constructional transformation", i.e., the transformation of a statement or propositional function with the aid of a constructional definition is a "logical translation", not a "translation of sense"; that is to say, it leaves the logical value unchanged (namely, the truth value of a proposition or the extension of a propositional function). but not always the epistemic value (50, 51)