Derk Pereboom

Derk PereboomFree Will yazarı
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Derk Pereboom (born 1957) is the Susan Linn Sage Professor in Philosophy and Ethics at Cornell University. He specializes in free will and moral responsibility, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and in the work of Immanuel Kant. Derk Pereboom was born in the village of Pesse, near Hoogeveen, the Netherlands, on February 6, 1957. He received his BA in philosophy at Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan, in 1978, where his teachers included Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff. He earned his PhD at University of California, Los Angeles in 1985, with a dissertation on Immanuel Kant's theory of mental representation under the supervision of Robert Merrihew Adams and Tyler Burge. He was an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Vermont from 1985 to 1991, associate professor from 1991 to 1997, and professor from 1997 to 2007. Since 2007, he has been professor in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University. As of 2018, he is the subject co-editor on topics in the philosophy of action for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and he has also written for the encyclopedia.
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Yazar
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1957

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In our everyday moral judgments, we typically do not suppose that actions result from deterministic causal processes that trace back to factors beyond their agent’s control. Our ordinary intuitions do not presuppose that causal determinism is true, and they could indeed it is false. The incompatibilist's claim is that if we did assume determinism and internalize its implications, our judgments about moral responsibility might well be different from what they are. Spinoza remarks, "experience itself, no less than reason, teaches that men believe themselves free because they are conscious of their own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined". Derk Pereboom
Sayfa 100Kitabı okudu
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The parties to the free will debate are traditionally grouped into camps with reference to whether causal determinism and free will are compatible: compatibilism: our having free will is compatible with causal determinism, with all of our actions being causally determined by factors beyond our control. incompatibilism: our having free will is not compatible with causal determinism, with all of our actions being causally determined by factors beyond our control.
Sayfa 2 - free will tartışmalarında, uyumluluk ve ve uyumsuzluk pozisyonlarıKitabı okudu
The resulting version of free will MR does distinguish the parties in the debate. Given this selection, here are the characterizations of the three traditional positions: hard determinism: because causal determinism is true, we cannot have the sort of free will required for moral responsibility in the basic desert sense. compatibilism: even if causal determinism is true, we can have the sort of free will required for moral responsibility in the basic desert sense, and we do in fact have it. libertarianism: because causal determinism is false, we can have the sort of free will required for moral responsibility in the basic desert sense, and we do in fact have it.
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