Metaphysical Realism and Anti-Realism
J. T. M. MillerSözler ve Alıntılar
The metaphysical realist need not be a realist with respect to all entities covered by the multitude of local realisms. To be a metaphysical realist does not mean that we necessarily are committed to scientific realism, moral realism, aesthetic realism, and so on. And being a local anti-realist about the Loch Ness Monster would not necessarily mean that we are committed to metaphysical anti-realism. Rather, metaphysical realism is general or global in the sense that the metaphysical realist thinks (minimally, pending later extensions) that at least one entity exists and it is independent of us. A commitment to metaphysical realism does not commit us to the existence of any particular entity or sort of entity – only to there being some (suitably mind-independent) entity.
Sayfa 5Kitabı okudu
Ontological nihilism faces a well-known inconsistency objection. If nihilism is true, then the thought ‘nothing exists’ must be true. But this implies that there exists a thought, and hence, nihilism is self-defeating.
Sayfa 27 - a rejection to ontologocial nihilismKitabı okudu
Carnap calls these meaningful ontological questions asked within a framework ‘internal questions’. These are contrasted with ‘external questions’. External questions are those that the realist is trying to ask and answer. They are an attempt to ask whether some entity exists independent of a linguistic framework.
Sayfa 41 - carnap'ın pozisyonu. makul ontolojik sorular sormak mümkün olan bir şey ama sadece dilin frameworkü içinde. yani, bunlar internal olmak zorunda. external soruların tamamı framework değiştirmekle alakalıdır, dolayısıyla bizi hakikatle karşılaştırmaz sKitabı okudu
Note Wittgenstein is not arguing that there is no mind-independent reality. This is because to even try to make the claim that mind-independent entities exist or not is to try to speak about something that cannot be spoken about. The mistake that the realist makes is to be tricked by language.
Sayfa 39 - wittynin metafizik ve realizm pozisyonuKitabı okudu
What this shows is that the realist and (at least Berkeleyan) idealist share some significant metaontological common ground. Both argue that it is possible to discuss and describe the nature of reality. This, in my view, at least partly explains the unpopularity of idealism today as an alternative to realism.
Sayfa 33 - idealizm-realizm tartışmaları neden antirealizm-realizm tartışmasına kaydı sorusunun cevabıKitabı okudu
there are things – entities of some sort – that exist and are the way that they are independent of how we happen to talk or think about them.
Sayfa 1 - the definition of the metaphysical realismKitabı okudu
Even this overly simplified description suffices for us to be able to easily see why Berkeleyan idealism is a common first view that people think of as an alternative to realism. Berkeley clearly cannot hold that there exists a mind- independent reality in that he holds that all that exists is mind-dependent. However, Berkeleyan idealism, nor idealism more generally, is not the normal territory for contemporary anti-realists. This is, I think, for two main reasons.
Sayfa 32 - berkeley'in pozisyonunu temize çekmek için. ayrıca kendini immateralist olarak tanıtıyormuşKitabı okudu