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Although the Turkmen had been Muslims for centuries and lived far from the central Asian steppes, many of the traditions of the steppe remained alive. Ismail presented his authority in the idiom of the Turkmen. Sufism among the Turkmen had mimicked the shamanism of their central Asian past, in which charismatic individuals claimed direct personal connections with the divine. Ismail was a charismatic young man of striking physical appearance; his poetry articulated that connection.
Çaldıran Savaşı ile Safevi Yayılmacılığının Durması
The defeat at Chaldiran ended the first phase of Safavid history. Geographically, the Safavids lost only the province of Diyar Bakr, but the momentum of expansion was gone. Ismail, who had been a charismatic, aggressive leader, became passive. He never led his troops in battle again. Of the last ten years of his reign, there is little to report. The establishment phase of the Safavid Empire ended with a Qizilbash confederation ruling Azerbaijan, Iraq, western Iran, and Khurasan. It confronted the Ottomans in the west and Uzbeks in the east and was committed to Shii Islam as the religion of the general population.
Şah İsmail'in Babür Şah'a Yardımları
In 1511, Safavid forces assisted Babur in retaking Samarqand and Bukhara from the Uzbeks. When the Safavids then withdrew, the Uzbeks drove Babur off. Ismail sent another army to Babur’s assistance, but dissension among the Safavid commanders led to a rout when the allies met the Uzbek forces at Ghujduvan. Though Ismail later drove the Uzbeks out of Khurasan, which they occupied after the battle, Ghujduvan ended expansion of the Safavid Empire.
Ismail emerged from his exile in Gilan in the summer of 1499, at the age of twelve. The disorders within the Aqquyunlu realm had continued during this period and prevented an immediate response to Ismail’s reappearance. He rapidly attracted a huge following, including seven major tribes: the Ustajlu, Shamlu, Takkelu, Varsaq, Rumlu, Zul Qadr, Afshar, and Qajar. These tribes formed the Qizilbash confederation. He led these forces against the old enemy of his family, the Shirvanshah, and by the end of 1500 had killed Farrukhyasar and subjugated the rich province he had ruled. The Safavid order had become a principality. In 1501, Ismail’s forces occupied Tabriz, the Aqquyunlu capital and the most important commercial center of western Iran. Ismail then defeated a series of Aqquyunlu princes.
In 1509, Uzbek forces raided Kirman, which was Safavid territory.
Shah Ismail sent two embassies to Shaybani Khan to dissuade him from expansion westward; Shaybani Khan responded by demanding that Ismail
accept Uzbek (Chingiz Khanid) suzerainty and return to the spiritual vocation of a Sufi. Ismail then led Safavid forces into Khurasan, met Shaybani Khan’s forces at Marv, and defeated them decisively on December 2, 1510.
After 1530, Ismail’s son, Shah Tahmasp, gradually strengthened his position enough to manipulate, rather than be manipulated by, the tribes. After his death, however, the tribal chiefs again dominated the empire until the time of Abbas I (1588–1629). Abbas transformed the Safavid polity from a tribal confederation into a bureaucratic empire. The primacy of the bureaucracy, with the tribes present but peripheral, survived until the rapid collapse of the empire in 1722.
Unlike earlier wars in Europe, the Long War produced no profit. The jalali disorders disrupted the economy of much of Anatolia. The timar army cost the central treasury almost nothing in cash; the central army and the sekban required cash payment, but the dwindling number of sipahis and the need for the larger armies that only the sekban could provide forced the Ottomans to alter the provincial financial, administrative, and military structure. They transferred much of the provincial revenue from timar holders to tax farmers and used the revenue to support sekban infantry rather than sipahi cavalry. This policy reflected not the military
obsolescence of the sipahis but their dwindling numbers, the need for
larger armies, and the interests of the qapiqullar.
Comparison with the Safavids and Mughals makes Ottoman success clear. In 1730, the Safavid regime had disappeared; a Safavid prince survived as puppet for Nadir Khan Afshar. The Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah was an emperor in name only, without the power, revenue, or territory to match his unquestioned imperial status. But the Ottoman Empire survived, despite some loss of territory and control of commercial networks.
The word “Janissary” derives from the Turkish yeni cheri (yeni çeri, new
army). They were originally an infantry bodyguard of a few hundred men
using the bow and edged weapons. They adopted firearms during the
reign of Murad II and were perhaps the first standing infantry force
equipped with firearms in the world. Janissary firepower and discipline
turned the tide of numerous Ottoman battles, including Varna, Baskent,
Chaldiran, Marj Dabik, and Mohacs. The early adaptation of firearms indicates that there was no cultural or institutional opposition to them. The
Janissary corps expanded steadily through the sixteenth century, growing
from 18,000 in 1527 to 45,000 in 1597.
Ibrahim’s son, Mehmed IV (1648–1687), ruled longer than any Ottoman
sultan except Sulayman I, yet made little impression upon history.
His reign is instead associated with another name, that of Köprülü. For
the first eight years of his reign, until he reached the age of fourteen,
Mehmed’s rule entailed merely undoing the effects of his father’s eccentricities.
As soon as the 1559 Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis ended hostilities between France and the Hapsburgs, Phillip II, who had taken the thrones of Spain and Naples on the abdication of his father, Charles V, in 1555, immediately organized a major naval expedition against the corsair base at the island of Jerba, off the coast of Tunisia. The Hapsburgs conquered the island, but in 1560 the Ottoman fleet under Piyale Pasha defeated the Hapsburg fleet there. In 1565, the Ottomans attempted to conquer Malta, which had become the base of the Knights of St. John after Sulayman drove them from Rhodes. The knights, under their grand master Jean Parisot de la Valette, won renown for the epic defense. The Ottomans withdrew before a relief force arrived.
Selim defeated another Turkmen uprising in Anatolia in 1520 and had
begun a campaign in Rumelia in 1520 when he died suddenly. In eight years,
he had transformed the Ottoman Empire from a peripheral into a central
power in the Islamic world, making it perhaps the most powerful empire in the world in his time. No other Ottoman ruler assembled a chain of great
victories comparable to his. His only son, Sulayman, succeeded him.
The Aqquyunlu ruler Uzun Hasan (r. 1467–1478) provides an excellent example. Uzun Hasan used the Turko-Mongol title bahadur (prince or monarch; literally, “hero”) and the Irano-Islamic title
padishah. He also claimed the Islamic title mujadid (renewer). This title
comes from a hadith in which the Prophet foresees that in every century a person will appear to renew Islam. Muslim writers have generally designated religious teachers, such as al-Ghazali, as mujadid, but Uzun Hasan was not the only post-Abbasid ruler to claim the title—Shah Rukh, Timur’s son and effective successor, did so as well—as it implied the intention to revivify Islam and Muslim institutions.