Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern World
Seapower States
Andrew LambertQuotes
The Limits of Continental Naval Power
The lack of a domestic merchant shipping industry had serious strategic implications. Trade with Britain, Russia’s largest customer, reflected mutual economic self- interest, not political connection
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Sea States and Overseas Empires
Montesquieu observed that republics could be ruled by aristocratic or oligarchic bodies, and this model can be applied to all true seapower. Montesquieu recognised that England became a ‘republic’ in 1688, when political power passed from Crown to Parliament, reducing the monarch to the status of hereditary figurehead.
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To What Great Profit are We Opening the Sea ( The Dutch Seapower State)
France had no desire to be a seapower, but it had a serious appetite for Spanish land and wealth, and a deep distrust of the republican political model of seapower states.
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Burning the Carthaginian Fleet
The Romans sought more land, wealth, power and control. By contrast, seapower Carthage sought a stable, balanced world
in which it could secure trade routes and profit from an expanding Mediterranean economy.
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England
The transfer of naval hegemony to the US was relatively painless because, although the two states took fundamentally different views of the world ocean, their ideological synergy ensured they did not pose an existential threat to each other
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