The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Karl R. PopperSözler ve Alıntılar
Moreover, if you admit as meaningful none except problems in natural science, any debate about the concept of ‘meaning’ will also turn out to be meaningless.
My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or ‘a creative intuition’, in Bergson’s sense. In a similar way Einstein speaks of the ‘search for those highly universal laws... from which a picture of the world can be obtained by pure deduction. There is no logical path’, he says, ‘leading to these... laws. They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an intellectual love (‘Einfühlung’) of the objects of experience.’
If you insist on strict proof (or strict disproof) in the empirical sciences, you will never benefit from experience, and never learn from it how wrong you are.
We may now return to a point made in the previous section: to my thesis that a subjective experience, or a feeling of conviction, can never justify a scientific statement, and that within science it can play no part except that of an object of an empirical (a psychological) inquiry. No matter how intense a feeling of conviction it may be, it can never justify a statement.
Shlick
"The problem of induction consists in asking for a logical justification of universal statements about reality... We recognize, with Hume, that there is no such logical justification: there can be none, simply because they are not genuine statements."
degree of corroboration ≠ probability
Sayfa 33
about falsibiality
Moreover, if you admit as meaningful none except problems in natural science, the concept of ‘meaning’ will also turn out to be meaningless. The dogma of meaning, once enthroned, is elevated forever above the battle. It can no longer be attacked It has become (in Wittgenstein’s own words) ‘unassailable and definitive’.
Sayfa 30