but are not themselves given in turn by adumbrations
No mental process, we said, is presented. That means that the perception of a mental process is a simple seeing of something which is (or can become) perceptually given as something absolute, and not as something identical in modes of appearance by adumbration. Everything which we have worked out about the givenness of the physical thing loses its sense here, and one must make that fully clear to oneself in detail. A mental process of feeling is not adumbrated. If I look at it, I have something absolute; it has no sides that could be presented sometimes in one mode and sometimes in another. I can think something true or something false about a feeling, but what I see when I look at it is there, with its qualities, its intensity, etc., absolutely. A violin tone, in contrast, with its objective identity, is given by adumbration, has its changing modes of appearance. These differ in accordance with whether I approach the violin or go farther away from it, in accordance with whether I am in the concert hall itself or am listening through the closed doors, etc. No one mode of appearance can claim to be the on that presents the tone absolutely […]
We therefore hold fast to the following: Whereas it is essential to givenness by appearances that no appearance presents the affair as something “absolute” instead of in a one-sided presentation, it is essential to the giveness of something immanent precisely to present something absolute which cannot ever be presented with respect to sides or be adumbrated. It is indeed evident also that the adumbrative sensation-contents themselves, which really inherently belong to the mental process of perceiving a physical thing, function, more particularly, as adumbrations of something but are not themselves given in turn by adumbrations.
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