Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government
Arend LijphartParliamentary Versus Presidential Government Sözleri ve Alıntıları
Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government sözleri ve alıntılarını, Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government kitap alıntılarını, Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government en etkileyici cümleleri ve paragragları 1000Kitap'ta bulabilirsiniz.
The constructive vote of no confidence means that a cabinet may remain in power but, because it is opposed by a majority in the legislature, be unable to get any of its proposed legislation adopted. This ushers in the problem of executive-legislative deadlock -the very problem that besets presidential government but that is supposed not to occur in parliamentary systems. Hence, while the constructive vote of no confidence may be able to alleviate cabinet instability, it is far from a complete solution.
Sayfa 12
A member of the government is ipso facto a member of parliament, but by definition he cannot be a member of the assembly.
Sayfa 35
Among the fifty-one Third World democracies, the parliamentary systems were significantly more successful than the presidential.
Sayfa 23
The great paradox of legislative-confidence is that, in Arthur M. Schlesinger's words, 'while the parliamentary system formally assumes legislative supremacy, in fact it assures the almost unassailable dominance of the executive over the legislature'.
Sayfa 13
'Parliament' will at all times signify a body which includes the government. When it is necessary to refer to the legislature excluding members of the government the term 'assembly' will be used.
Sayfa 33
All of the alternatives have their advantages and disadvantages, and that no obvious winner has emerged from the debate among their respective proponents. The empirical evidence favours the parliamentary model, at least to some extent, but this is only limited evidence that is unlikely to convince strong supporters of presidential government.
Sayfa 25
Semi-presidentialism does have undeniable merits, and it has great appeal -especially in presidential democracies in which dissatisfaction with presidentialism has been growing. It has ben under active consideration in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, and has considerable support in many other Latin American countries.
Sayfa 21
It is worth noting that Great Britain has served not only as the principal model of parliamentarism but also, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as the opposite separation-of-powers model -as seen in the writings of Montesquieu, Madison, and Bolivar.
Sayfa 5
How serious is the problem of cabinet instability in parliamentary systems really? (...) Cabinet instability becomes a problem only when it assumes extreme forms, such as in the French Fourth Republic where the average cabinet life was only seven to ten months. (...) But vast majority of parliamentary systems have considerably more durable cabinets even when these cabinets tend to be multi-party coalitions. And when cabinets last for at least two or three years, the difference from guaranteed presidential terms of, say, four to five years becomes insignificant. (...) The executive 'instability' of parliamentary systems may give these systems the flexibility to change governments quickly when changed circumstances or serious executive failures call for new leadership, whereas the 'stability' of presidential executives may spell dangerous rigidity.
Sayfa 12
In order to avoid winner-take-all, it is not sufficient to adopt a parliamentary form of government; elections by proportional representation, a multi-party system, and coalition cabinets are also necessary.
Sayfa 22
It is not presidentialism itself, but the combination of presidentialism with a particular party-system configuration, that is responsible for the big problem of executive-legislative deadlock.
Sayfa 21
French semi-presidentialism does not mean either a synthesis of the parliamentary and presidential types or an intermediate category more or less halfway between them. Rather, it entails an alternation of parliamentary and presidential phases, depending on whether or not the president's party has a majority in the legislature.
Sayfa 8
Yet in a very real sense it is the assembly which is ultimately supreme. (...) In parliamentary states the constitution has to be amended by both government and assembly acting as parliament, whereas in presidential systems the assembly may amend the constitution without regard to the president.
Sayfa 45
For parliamentarism to succeed, the government must not fret at the constant challenge which the Assembly offers to its programme, nor wince at the criticism made of its administration. The Assembly in turn must resist the temptation to usurp the functions of Government. Here is a delicate balance of powers which check each other without the benefit of separate institutions.
Sayfa 38
The neither of the constituent elements of parliament may completely dominate the other. (...) Many parliamentary systems have failed because one or other of them has claimed supremacy, and parliament as a whole has not been supreme over both government and assembly.
Sayfa 37