"Kuzey İrlanda gibi derin ayrımların olduğu toplumlarda, çoğunluk egemenliği demokrasiden ziyade çoğunluk diktatörlüğü ve iç kargaşa anlamına gelir. Bu tip toplumların ihtiyacı olan şey karşıtlık yerine uzlaşmayı vurgulayan, dışlayıcı değil kapsayıcı olan, az bir çoğunlukla yetinmek yerine iktidara gelen çoğunluğun oranının mümkün olduğu kadar yüksek olması için çabalayan demokratik bir rejim, yani oydaşmacı demokrasidir. "
The constructive vote of no confidence means that a cabinet may remain in power but, because it is opposed by a majority in the legislature, be unable to get any of its proposed legislation adopted. This ushers in the problem of executive-legislative deadlock -the very problem that besets presidential government but that is supposed not to occur in parliamentary systems. Hence, while the constructive vote of no confidence may be able to alleviate cabinet instability, it is far from a complete solution.
The great paradox of legislative-confidence is that, in Arthur M. Schlesinger's words, 'while the parliamentary system formally assumes legislative supremacy, in fact it assures the almost unassailable dominance of the executive over the legislature'.
It is worth noting that Great Britain has served not only as the principal model of parliamentarism but also, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as the opposite separation-of-powers model -as seen in the writings of Montesquieu, Madison, and Bolivar.
All of the alternatives have their advantages and disadvantages, and that no obvious winner has emerged from the debate among their respective proponents. The empirical evidence favours the parliamentary model, at least to some extent, but this is only limited evidence that is unlikely to convince strong supporters of presidential government.
Semi-presidentialism does have undeniable merits, and it has great appeal -especially in presidential democracies in which dissatisfaction with presidentialism has been growing. It has ben under active consideration in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, and has considerable support in many other Latin American countries.
How serious is the problem of cabinet instability in parliamentary systems really? (...) Cabinet instability becomes a problem only when it assumes extreme forms, such as in the French Fourth Republic where the average cabinet life was only seven to ten months. (...) But vast majority of parliamentary systems have considerably more durable cabinets even when these cabinets tend to be multi-party coalitions. And when cabinets last for at least two or three years, the difference from guaranteed presidential terms of, say, four to five years becomes insignificant. (...) The executive 'instability' of parliamentary systems may give these systems the flexibility to change governments quickly when changed circumstances or serious executive failures call for new leadership, whereas the 'stability' of presidential executives may spell dangerous rigidity.