Bilimsel Araştırmanın Mantığı
Karl R. PopperEn Beğenilen Bilimsel Araştırmanın Mantığı Sözleri ve Alıntıları
En Beğenilen Bilimsel Araştırmanın Mantığı sözleri ve alıntılarını, en beğenilen Bilimsel Araştırmanın Mantığı kitap alıntılarını, etkileyici sözleri 1000Kitap'ta bulabilirsiniz.In the eyes of the upholders of inductive logic, a principle ofinduction is of supreme importance for scientific method: ‘...this principle’, says Reichenbach, ‘determines the truth of scientific theories. To eliminate it from science would mean nothing less than to deprive science of the power to decide the truth or falsity of its theories. Without it, clearly, science would no longer have the right to distinguish its theories from the fanciful and arbitrary creations of the poet’s mind.’
Thus Schlick says: ‘... a genuine statement must be capable of conclusive verification’ and Waismann says still more clearly: ‘If there is no possible way to determine whether a statement is true then that statement has no meaning whatsoever. For the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification.’ Now in my view there is no such thing as induction. Thus inference to theories, from singular statements which are ‘verified by experience’ (whatever that may mean), is logically inadmissible. Theories are, therefore, never empirically verifiable.
Liebig (in Induktion und Deduktion, 1865) was probably the first to reject the inductive method from the standpoint of natural science; his attack is directed against Bacon. Duhem (in La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, 1906; English translation by P. P. Wiener: The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton, 1954) holds pronounced deductivist views. (*But there are also inductivist views to be found in Duhem’s book, for example in the third chapter, Part One, where we are told that only experiment, induction, and generalization have produced Descartes’s law of refraction; cf. the English translation, p. 34.) So does V. Kraft, Die Grundformen der Wissenschaftlichen Methoden, 1925; see also Carnap, Erkenntnis 2, 1932, p. 440.
Üst bir kural
In establishing these rules we may proceed systematically. First a supreme rule is laid down which serves as a kind of norm for deciding upon the remaining rules, and which is thus a rule of a higher type. It is the rule which says that the other rules of scientific procedure must be designed in such a way that they do not protect any statement in science against falsification.
Sayfa 33
natüralizm, gözlem ve nedensellik
Thus I reject the naturalistic view. It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe themselves to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into a dogma. This criticism of the naturalistic view applies not only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science, and consequently to its idea of empirical method.
Sayfa 31
It is usual to call an inference 'inductive' if it passes from
singular principle of induction (which he formulated as the 'principle of universal causation') to be 'a priori valid'. But I do not think that his ingenious attempt to provide an a priori justification for synthetic statements was successful.
Sayfa 5