Bilimsel Araştırmanın Mantığı
Karl R. PopperBilimsel Araştırmanın Mantığı Sözleri ve Alıntıları
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In the eyes of the upholders of inductive logic, a principle ofinduction is of supreme importance for scientific method: ‘...this principle’, says Reichenbach, ‘determines the truth of scientific theories. To eliminate it from science would mean nothing less than to deprive science of the power to decide the truth or falsity of its theories. Without it, clearly, science would no longer have the right to distinguish its theories from the fanciful and arbitrary creations of the poet’s mind.’
METHODOLOGICAL RULES AS CONVENTIONS
Methodological rules are here regarded as conventions. They might be described as the rules of the game of empirical science. They differ from the rules of pure logic rather as do the rules of chess, which few would regard as part of pure logic: seeing that the rules of pure logic govern transformations of linguistic formulae, the result of an inquiry into the rules of chess could perhaps be entitled ‘The Logic of Chess’, but hardly ‘Logic’ pure and simple. (Similarly, the result of an inquiry into the rules of the game of science—that is, of scientific discovery— may be entitled ‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’.)
Two simple examples of methodological rules may be given. They will suffice to show that it would be hardly suitable to place an inquiry into method on the same level as a purely logical inquiry.
(1) The game of science is, in principle, without end. He who decides one day that scientific statements do not call for any further test, and that they can be regarded as finally verified, retires from the game.
(2) Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, and has proved its mettle,*1 it may not be allowed to drop out without ‘good reason’. A ‘good reason’ may be, for instance: replacement of the hypothesis by another which is better testable; or the falsification of one of the consequences of the hypothesis. (The concept ‘better testable’ will later be analysed more fully.)
These two examples show what methodological rules look like. Clearly they are very different from the rules usually called ‘logical’. Although logic may perhaps set up criteria for deciding whether a statement is testable, it certainly is not concerned with the question whether anyone exerts himself to test it.
Sayfa 32
Thus Schlick says: ‘... a genuine statement must be capable of conclusive verification’ and Waismann says still more clearly: ‘If there is no possible way to determine whether a statement is true then that statement has no meaning whatsoever. For the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification.’ Now in my view there is no such thing as induction. Thus inference to theories, from singular statements which are ‘verified by experience’ (whatever that may mean), is logically inadmissible. Theories are, therefore, never empirically verifiable.
Üst bir kural
In establishing these rules we may proceed systematically. First a supreme rule is laid down which serves as a kind of norm for deciding upon the remaining rules, and which is thus a rule of a higher type. It is the rule which says that the other rules of scientific procedure must be designed in such a way that they do not protect any statement in science against falsification.
Sayfa 33
Liebig (in Induktion und Deduktion, 1865) was probably the first to reject the inductive method from the standpoint of natural science; his attack is directed against Bacon. Duhem (in La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, 1906; English translation by P. P. Wiener: The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton, 1954) holds pronounced deductivist views. (*But there are also inductivist views to be found in Duhem’s book, for example in the third chapter, Part One, where we are told that only experiment, induction, and generalization have produced Descartes’s law of refraction; cf. the English translation, p. 34.) So does V. Kraft, Die Grundformen der Wissenschaftlichen Methoden, 1925; see also Carnap, Erkenntnis 2, 1932, p. 440.
It is usual to call an inference 'inductive' if it passes from
singular principle of induction (which he formulated as the 'principle of universal causation') to be 'a priori valid'. But I do not think that his ingenious attempt to provide an a priori justification for synthetic statements was successful.
Sayfa 5
natüralizm, gözlem ve nedensellik
Thus I reject the naturalistic view. It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe themselves to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into a dogma. This criticism of the naturalistic view applies not only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science, and consequently to its idea of empirical method.
Sayfa 31